T5 Forged insertion
The attacker writes a brand-new record in the store's own format, with a valid-looking id and the right parent, saying the user approved something.
What stops it
A key the attacker does not hold: records are signed or MACed with something that is not in the store directory.
What does not
Stores where the only check is that the record is well formed.
Today, measured 2026-10-07
- rejected on read
- OpenFang model, tip-persistence fix, acrf-memory-guard, per-entry HMAC over a JSON store, Agent Memory reference runtime, SQLite canonical substrate, bucketed row digests, fail-closed open
- reported on audit
- inspeximus, receipts on, attacker holds the store directory, inspeximus, receipts on, attacker also holds the config home, memory-blackbox memory.md watcher, agent process alive, scan audit, memory-blackbox memory.md watcher, agent restarted before the scan, scan audit, Atelya Attest, keyed hash chain, verify_chain audit, Atelya Attest, keyed hash chain plus anchored head, verify and consistency audit, CONTINUUM event log, hash chain, verify_events audit, CONTINUUM event log, hash chain plus Ed25519-signed head, attest-verify audit
- accepted
- LangGraph SqliteSaver, LangGraph PostgresSaver, LangGraph RedisSaver, OpenAI Agents SDK SQLiteSession, LlamaIndex Memory, SQLAlchemy chat store, CrewAI long-term memory, LanceDB dataset, Vertex AI Agent Engine Memory Bank, managed store, edits through the data-plane API, Letta block checkpoint history, Mem0 local Qdrant store, inspeximus, receipts off (default), langgraph-ledger over SqliteSaver, hash-chained ledger, verify_thread audit, AtMem 2.3.7, audit chain alone, verify() audit, AtMem 2.3.7, audit chain with an external checkpoint outside the attacker-controlled store directory, verify() audit
agmi-check --adapter agmi.adapters.langgraph_sqlite:LangGraphSqliteAdapter # runs T1 to T8; this is T5